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ARGUMENT
I.
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p R E S E N T E D

T H E

APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Murray City claims that regardless of the nature oi the uu •. u-.
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*
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administrative agency is applying legal principles, its decisions are reviewed for
'Doss. Sec King v. Industrial Comm n. 8DU , .
i ***

i

rrection c

standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Officer Lucas concedes that most administrative proceedings do not strictly apply
legal principles, llowcvei, OIL J Juira> I 'ily I 'i\ il Service <
"Cninmr.Moiri ilii HI! In Hs ovui 11 Irs nlopled the I Jtah Rules of Evidence. See Murray
Civil Service Commission Rule 13-10. (Opening briet. exhibit T Therefore, the
Commission's rulings on evidence and legal theories should ov. u \ icwed under a
correctness standai cl,1

liven if this (.*>urt applies an abuse of discretion standard to all of the issues raised, it
must still reverse the Commission's decisions. "The fact that administrative agencies may not
be bound by formal rules of evidence and procedure does not mean that they are above the
law." "An agency must at some point address the legal issues raised by a party appearing
before it" Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(discussing abuse of discretion standard in administrative proceedings).
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II.
THE CITY'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE
COMMISSION ARE INAPPOSITE
In its responsive memorandum, Murray City repeats time and again that the
Commission had only two roles at the hearing: (1) To determine whether sufficient
facts existed to support Chief Killian's decision that Officer Lucas should be disciplined
for untruthfulness; and (2) To determine whether the discipline given was warranted
under the circumstances. Murray City claims that because the Commission was limited
to these two determinations, all of Officer Lucas' arguments regarding evidence,
retaliatory motives, and procedural error are irrelevant.
Officer Lucas does not dispute the Commission's role. However, this does not
invalidate Officer Lucas' argument. The first role of the Commission, as articulated by
Murray City, requires the Commission to weigh all facts available to determine whether
there was sufficient evidence to support Chief Killian's decision. Because the
Commission suppressed critical facts, it was not able to assess whether Chief Killian's
decision was justified under the circumstances. For example, the Commission
suppressed the playing of an audiotape which contained a retraction by Martin Spegar,
Officer Lucas' accuser. (R. at 575). It excluded evidence that Chief Killian and Lt.
Fondaco were biased against Officer Lucas because he reported their alleged
misconduct to the Utah Attorney General's office. (R. at 142-48; 162-3). The
Commission ignored evidence that Murray City had not followed its own procedures in
conducting the investigation of Officer Lucas. (R. at 707-17). These issues are directly
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n'k'van! to the Commissions' determination of whether the facts available supported
Chief Killian's deeiv n to fire Officer T.ucas.
In short, the rok %,i s.:*. * uiuin,.^..!.. .4
demonstrating i

' •
dishonest, that h^ accujv. *.~d recanted

story, that Murray City did not follow proper procedures in carrying out the internal
affairs investigation, and that Officer Lucas was actually dismissed in retaliation for
reporting his superior

.a.vgedmiscoiiilii< I

in,
EVIDENCE THAT OFFICER LUCAS WAS DISCHARGED
AS AN ACT OF RETALIATION WAS IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED
Murray f "ih «i "yiios l)m il»«" < "<»mmissiori^ decision to exclude evidence that
Offn ••• : ucas was terminated in retaliation for participation in an Attorne\ Gener.*'
investigation was appropriate because (1) the Commission Is not bomu

..

1

Rules of Evidence, (,.!) the evidence was induum!, .1 il ( 11 m ru 1T1I
ti inn v i. mi in mi in
A.

Mii'sr anniments are without

invent.

THE COMMISSION IS BOUND TO FOLLOW THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
WHEN PRACTICAL
I' i. 111 I s 111«•"-. *»( l\ii1niiT are not sun <K -"^plied at an administrative hearing

unless the agency ac nn< i k iules. See Pilcher v. Dept. of Social Services.
450, 453 (Utah 198?

i u-.i ,,- .,,L .Kunn e t,.* v w. . .-o- j .

" Because the City argues that each of the Commission's errors, was iiai inks'. ( HTirer
.«-1 discuss the harm to his case cumulatively in Section VII, infra.
Murray City attempts to distinguish Pilcher on the grounds that ii applies n ;h,
r r;v;\ Procedure, not the I Jtah Rules of Evidence. This, however, is not a n u...

v.ti

''fo>*mole contmui <J
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with a copy of its Rules and Regulations which state that "At all hearings, the
Commission will determine the admissibility of evidence and shall use as near as it
deems practicable the Rules of Evidence followed by courts of this State." (Id. § 13-10)
(emphasis added).
1.

The Commission Erred If the Utah Rules of Evidence Applied

Murray City argues that even if the Utah Rules of Evidence applied, evidence of
retaliation was still properly excluded as irrelevant pursuant to Rule 402. However, the
City does not justify this position in light of the rules that specifically allow introduction
of evidence of "bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent

" Utah R. Evid. 608(c).

See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (same). In fact, it is well established under Utah
law that testimony reflecting bias of a witness is relevant and admissible. Ong Int'l, Inc.
v. Eleventh Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 459 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Hackford, 737
P.2d 200, 202 (Utah, 1987) (bias evidence is always relevant). Therefore, evidence that
the internal affairs investigator and Chief Killian were biased against Officer Lucas, and
wanted to fire him as an act of revenge, should have been admitted. Such evidence
reflects directly on their credibility and the grounds for their decision to terminate
Officer Lucas' employment.

distinction. The clear import of Pilcher is that administrative agencies are not required to
follow formal legal rules unless the agency has adopted those rules. Id. "Thus, administrative
proceedings are not subject to the [Rules] unless the governing statute or regulations so
provide." Id. (Emphasis added).
248/146044
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B.

EVEN IF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE DID NOT APPLY, THE
COMMISSION ERRED,
Even if this Court determines that the Utah Rules of Evidence did not apply at the

hearing, the Commission's decision must be reversed. "Despite the flexibility of
administrative hearings [with respect to] evidence, due process requires minimum
safeguards,... all parties must be . . . given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to
request documents and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way can
a party maintain its rights or make its defense." Tolman, 819 P.2d at 29 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added). "The fact that administrative agencies may not be bound by
formal rules of evidence . . . does not mean that they are above the law." Id. at 31. The
Commission's decision to prevent Officer Lucas from proving he was fired in retaliation
for reporting internal corruption prevented him from "making his defense" and is
reversible under Tolman. Id. at 29.
IV.
THE COMMISSION WRONGFULLY EXCLUDED
A TAPE RECORDED RETRACTION BY
OFFICER LUCAS' ACCUSER
It is undisputed that Martin Spegar, the person who accused Officer Lucas of
pointing a gun at his head, later retracted portions of his testimony in a taped interview
with a polygrapher. The interview followed Mr. Spegar's polygraph exam in which he
scored an overall -3 (indicating dishonesty) (R. 323-6). The Commission prevented
Officer Lucas from playing the taped retraction as impeachment of Mr. Spegar's
testimony before the Commission. Murray City's only arguments as to why the taped
retraction by Officer Lucas' accuser was properly excluded are (1) Officer Lucas never
248/146044
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objected to the decision excluding the evidence and (2) the error was harmless. Both
arguments are baseless.
A.

OFFICER LUCAS PROPERLY OBJECTED TO THE COMMISSION'S
RULING
Officer Lucas's counsel expressly objected to the Commission's ruling that the

audiotape could not be played. (R. at 575). Utah law regarding sufficiency of
objections clarifies that counsel's role in objecting is to allow the tribunal a chance to
correct its mistake at the time of occurrence. See Anderson v. Sharp, 899 P.2d 1245,
1248 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). That clearly occurred. Furthermore, the rule requiring a
clear objection specifies that it applies when the Court is admitting objectionable
evidence. Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (clear objection must be made if ruling is to allow
inadmissible evidence). Thus, the burden was on the City to object to the admission of
the tape, which the City did not do in a timely manner. (R. 574). Lastly, because of the
confusion created by a sua sponte ruling by the Commission's legal adviser, any
decision by this Court about the sufficiency of counsel's objection should err toward
finding an objection to have been made.4
Murray City also contends that the Commission would have allowed the evidence
to be authenticated by Lt. Vern Petersen, the polygrapher who taped the interview. This
4

Counsel was at a disadvantage as to how and when to object since Mr. Ferguson (the
"legal advisor") made the decision to exclude the tape prior to any objection from Murray City
and without question by any Commissioner about the recording's admissibility. Therefore, it is
unclear when the "ruling" was made. (See R. at 575). Nevertheless, it is clear that Officer
Lucas' counsel attempted to play the tape and have Mr. Spegar lay the proper foundation even
after Mr. Ferguson indicated he did not want the tape played. Thus, the Commission had the
chance to correct its ruling.
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argument contradicts the rule of evidence stating that the party whose voice is recorded
is the property party to authenticate a recording. UtahR.Evid. 1007. Moreover, the
City omits the fact that as soon as the Commission made the ruling in question, Murray
City's counsel informed Lt. Petersen (who was under a subpoena) that he was free to
leave, irrespective of his subpoena. Murray City did not inform the Commission or
Officer Lucas' counsel of its actions. Thus, when Officer Lucas attempted to call Lt.
Peterson to authenticate the tape, Lt. Petersen was unavailable. In an effort to comply
with the Commission's instructions to complete the hearing that day, Officer Lucas
proceeded forward by introducing the transcript of the audiotape of Mr. Spegar's
polygraph interview. (Transcript at p. 211). However, there was no witness to lay the
foundation for this testimony, and Lt. Fondaco and Chief Killian denied reviewing the
transcript or the audiotape prior to their decision to fire Officer Lucas. Thus, the effect
of the recantation by Mr. Spegar and the chance to discredit Mr. Spegar were lost.5
V.
THE COMMISSION WRONGFULLY IGNORED
MURRAY CITY'S PROCEDURAL ERRORS
Officer Lucas contends that the Commission erred when it failed to analyze or
even mention his argument that Murray City purposefully disobeyed its own procedures
in order to terminate his employment. See Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31-2 ("at a minimum,
the [Commission] should have addressed [his] legal contentions in its findings and

5

Officer Lucas notes that this confusion and prejudice to his case presentation were
some of the harms caused by the Commission's decision to allow Mr. Ferguson to participate as
he did.
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conclusions"). Murray City's responses to this point were (1) Officer Lucas never
identified any procedural deficiencies; and (2) Officer Lucas was not terminated as a
result of procedural errors, but because of dishonesty.
Officer Lucas introduced evidence before the Commission that Murray City had
failed to follow its own procedures. He urged the Commission to set aside the discipline
based upon these procedural deficiencies. This evidence included the following errors:
(1)

The internal affairs investigation of Officer Lucas lasted more than 30
days whereas Murray City Policy and Procedure requires such
investigations to be completed within 30 days (R. 707-9);

(2)

Officer Lucas was never informed at any time that the internal affairs
investigation against him had been changed from one of excessive force
to one of dishonesty, whereas City policy requires investigations to
inform an Officer of the scope of their investigation (R. 710);

(3)

Officer Lucas had not been provided with a written statement of the
charges against him before he was interrogated by Lt. Fondaco in
contravention of City policy and procedure (R. 709-10);

(4)

The failure to notify Officer Lucas of the original charge against him
(excessive force) and that the investigation had changed to one of
dishonesty were both violations of City policy (R. 710-13); and

(5)

Lt. Fondaco never contacted the Utah Attorney General's Office or any
other investigative authority regarding the internal affairs investigation
of excessive force as indicated by City policy (R. 716-17).

The fact that the Commission failed to address this issue in its decision does not
mean that Officer Lucas did not raise it. To the contrary, it demonstrates that the
Commission erred in evaluating this defense.
It is also noteworthy that Murray City failed to distinguish, or even contest the
cases cited by Officer Lucas which hold that public employers must follow established
248/146044
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procedure before disciplinary actions can be sustained. Officers have a property
interest in continued employment as well as the procedures which protect their
employment rights. See e^., Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598, 601-2
(Utah 1980); Anderson v. City of Lawton, 748 P.2d 53, 55 (Ok. App. 1987) (officer
discharged outside of established policy must be reinstated).
VI.
THE COMMISSION IMPROPERLY ALLOWED
ITS LEGAL ADVISOR TO PARTICIPATE
AS A COMMISSIONER
In response to Officer Lucas' argument that the Commission inappropriately
allowed its legal advisor to conduct interrogation of fact witnesses, to comment on
evidence on the record, and to make sua sponte rulings, Murray City contends that the
Commission was justified in so acting because it was called upon to make numerous
complex legal rulings, and therefore, participation by a legal advisor was mandated.
Officer Lucas first calls attention to the inherent contradiction in Murray City's
arguments. In dealing with the Commission's evidentiary errors, Murray City argues
that the Utah Rules of Evidence do not apply and the Commission's only role was to
make factual findings. Conversely, in explaining Mr. Ferguson's role, Murray City
argues that the Commission had so many complicated legal decisions to make that it had
to retain a legal advisor. Officer Lucas agrees that the Commission had legal decisions
to make, and Murray City's concession on this point demonstrate that its arguments to
the contrary are disingenuous.

248/146044
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However, even this concession does not justify the Commission's actions. As
Murray City also concedes, this Court should reverse the Commission if it finds the
Commission acted outside its scope of authority. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Civil
Service Comm'n, 908 P.2d 871, 876 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). It is outside of the
Commission's authority to allow a non-commissioner to interrogate fact witnesses,
comment and give his opinion on witness' statements, and make sua sponte rulings
without request by any commissioner. Mr. Ferguson acted not only as a fourth
commissioner, he participated more than all commissioners combined. Such conduct is
clearly beyond the scope of the Utah Code which narrowly defines the number,
qualification, and role of civil service commissioners. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-31001 to -06; see also, Williams v. PSC 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988) ("any reasonable
doubt of the existence of any [administrative] power must be resolved against the
existence thereof). Accordingly, the decision of the Commission cannot stand.
VII.
THE COMMISSION'S ERRORS
HARMED OFFICER LUCAS
In numerous sections, Murray City argues that even if the Commission did err, its
errors were harmless. Interestingly, Murray City has not attempted to demonstrate that
the harms Officer Lucas has already listed in his opening brief (e.g. opening brief at p.
31) were not sufficiently harmful. Instead, the City makes the bald assertion that all of
the Commission's errors were harmless, without addressing Officer Lucas' claims.
Officer Lucas concedes that the Commission's decisions will not be reversed if
its errors are found "sufficiently inconsequential that [this Court] concludes there is no
248/146044
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reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v.
Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 902 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
In Jacques, the Court outlined the factors relevant to the determination of whether
an error was harmful.
In determining whether reversal is required, several factors
are considered including "the importance of the witnesses'
testimony to the . . . case, whether the testimony was
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness
on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise
furnished, and, of course, the overall strength of the . . .
case."
Id. at 903 (citation omitted). Based on this standard, the Commission's errors were
harmful to Officer Lucas' case.
A.

REGARDING EVIDENCE OF RETALIATION
Retaliation was key to Officer Lucas' defense because it explained why the City

wanted to terminate his employment and why the City was willing to violate its own
policies to do so. Moreover, it was not cumulative of other defenses presented by
Officer Lucas. The Commission did not simply exclude one witness on this point, but
all evidence demonstrating retaliation. Thus, there was no likelihood that the
Commission understood the facts through testimony that was admitted. Finally, Officer
Lucas proffered numerous corroborating witnesses to support the defense, but the
Commission still refused to allow any evidence of retaliation.
Exclusion of this evidence must be presumed to have prejudiced Officer Lucas'
case. "[EJvidence of bias or motive is always relevant as discrediting the witness and
affecting the weight of his testimony." State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 200, 202 (Utah
248/146044
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1987). "Therefore, if a prior instance of conduct is relevant to a witness' bias or motive
to testify differently than would otherwise be the case, evidence pertaining to that
conduct is not subject to exclusion under Rule 608(b)." Id. Cases which have found
exclusion of such testimony harmless error have almost uniformly done so on the
ground that the fact finder "had sufficient information to fully appraise [the witness']
biases and motivations" without the evidence. E.g., Hackford, 737 P.2d at 205. The
Commission had no other evidence before it regarding bias.
B.

REGARDING THE TAPED RETRACTION BY OFFICER LUCAS' ACCUSER
A tape recorded retraction by Officer Lucas' accuser was perhaps the most

damaging evidence against the City's case. As pointed out numerous times by the City,
Officer Lucas was fired for the alleged dishonesty of denying that the pointed his gun at
Mr. Spegar, not for excessive force. Hence, if Officer Lucas could prove that Mr.
Spegar lied when he accused Officer Lucas, that would also prove Officer Lucas was
being truthful when he denied the conduct. Again, Officer Lucas was not simply
prevented from cross-examining Mr. Spegar about the tape, but from even playing the
tape to the Commission. As highlighted by Jacques, the error was made perse harmful
because of the importance of the witness involved, his accuser. Officer Lucas was
prevented from effectively cross-examining Mr. Spegar regarding his accusation and
allowing the Commission to assess Mr. Spegar's credibility.
C.

REGARDING THE COMMISSION'S FAILURE TO ANALYZE THE CITY'S
PROCEDURAL ERRORS
In order to have a fair hearing it is critical that the Commission listen to and

analyze a grievant's arguments. Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31. Officer Lucas argued that
248/146044
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Murray City intentionally ignored procedures in order to fire him. During the hearing,
the City's internal affairs investigator admitted to violating several procedures designed
to protect an officer's employment rights. (R. 707-17). The Commission did not even
address Officer Lucas' arguments regarding procedural errors in any of itsfindingsor
conclusions. Officer Lucas was harmed by this error because without explanation from
a tribunal of why it rejects or does not reach an argument, a hearing serves no purpose.
Id. This Court has previously held that when an agency neglects to address an issue "the
party wishing to defend an agency decision has the burden of showing that the
undisclosedfindingwas actually made." Adams v. Industrial Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 5
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Thus, Officer Lucas is presumed to be harmed unless Murray
City proves otherwise. See id. Murray City has not even attempted this showing.

vra.
THE SANCTION OF EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION
WAS EXCESSIVE
In the end, this entire case came down to a question of whether Officer Lucas,
during a hostile search, had his gun out of his holster and pointed in a low-ready
position or merely in its holster with his hand on the grip. Even if the Commission and
the Court assume for argument that Officer Lucas knew his gun was pointed at the
ground and yet said it was in its holster, that conduct does not warrant termination.
Chief Killian and Lt. Fondaco admitted that during the entire investigation
period, Officer Lucas was able to effectively perform his duties as an officer. He was
never placed on leave. Thus, it was clear, evenfromthe City's witnesses, that Officer
Lucas could have continued his job. Because the City admitted to adopting a policy of
248/146044
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progressive discipline, the sanction of employment termination under such
circumstances was unjustified. Moreover, other officers who had been accused of more
egregious dishonesty, and who later admitted that they had lied, were not fired by the
City. Therefore, the decision to fire Officer Lucas was arbitrary.
An officer with over 10 years of service, an unblemished record, and a recipient
of numerous awards should not be fired because his Chief believes his weapon was
drawn in a low ready position rather than in its holster. Such discipline is
disproportionate, and abusive.
IX.
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO SUPPORT
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION
The parties agree that this Court's review of the Commission's factual
determinations must be whether "substantial evidence" which would "convince a
reasonable mind" exists to support the Commission's decision. E.g., Harken v. Board of
Oil Gas and Minerals, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah 1996). In his opening brief, Officer
Lucas devoted six pages (pp. 14-19) to marshalling the evidence in order to demonstrate
that no evidence of an intent to deceive was introduced.
Murray City's only response is that Officer Lucas' initial statement (that he did
not draw his weapon) compared to his later statement (that he does not remember
drawing his weapon, but concedes he may have done so if another officer saw his
weapon out) is inconsistent. Thus, Murray City claims Officer Lucas was reasonably
believed to be lying.

248/146044
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Officer Lucas introduced expert testimony through Dr. Kenneth Rodgers
indicating that such an inability to recall whether a weapon was in a holster or in a low
ready position is normal under the circumstances. Dr. Rodgers' testimony was not
rebutted. Murray City put on no witness who claimed Officer Lucas intended to deceive
Lt. Fondaco or Chief Killian. Officer Lucas quite candidly told his superiors that he did
not remember drawing his weapon, but would not contradict an officer who says he saw
Officer Lucas do so; Officer Lucas simply could not recall.
Not only did Murray City fail to put on "substantial evidence" that Officer Lucas
was being deceitful when he made this statement; no evidence was put on that Officer
Lucas intended to deceive his superiors or tried to prevent others from disclosing the
truth to his supervisors. To the contrary, when Officer Snow indicated to Officer Lucas
that he had seen Officer Lucas' weapon out of its holster, Officer Lucas encouraged
Officer Snow to give that information to Lt. Fondaco and Chief Killian. (R. 618).
Murray City has not and cannot provide substantial evidence to demonstrate that
Officer Lucas wanted to deceive his superiors in this situation. Thus, the Commission's
decision to uphold Chief Killian's decision must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Following his termination for alleged dishonesty, Officer Lucas attempted to
prove that his accuser retracted his statements; that he was fired in retaliation for a prior
report to the Attorney General rather than the alleged dishonesty; and, that Murray City
purposefully ignored its own policies and procedures in order to fire him. The
Commission prevented Officer Lucas from having a fair opportunity to do any of these
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things. He was prevented from playing a taped retraction of his accuser's statements;
prevented from showing that Lt. Fondaco and Chief Killian were biased against him and
had a motive to retaliate against him for reporting their alleged misconduct to the
Attorney General's office; and, finally in its rush to uphold Chief Killian's decision, the
Commission failed to even acknowledge his arguments about the City's procedural
violations. Each of these items deprived Officer Lucas of a fair hearing; cumulatively
they ensured that Officer Lucas had no chance to "make his defense" as he was entitled.
Lastly, no evidence was presented to indicate Officer Lucas intended to deceive
anyone. A complete lack of evidence is not "substantial evidence." For all of these
reasons, Officer Lucas respectfully submits that the Commission's decision to uphold
Chief Killian's decision should be vacated and Officer Lucas reinstated with full back
pay.
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